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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the "theory of reasoned action" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980;
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and, more recently, the "theory of planned behavior"
(Ajzen, 1988, 1991) have been the focus of over 250 empirical studies (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1993). It is fairly well accepted that these theories serve as good predictors
of intention or performance of actual behavior. Yet the theory of planned
behavior works on the implicit assumption that the processes involved with
decision making are controlled; when individuals are required to make behavioral
decisions, they weigh available information about the behavior. This information
determines people's attitudes toward the behavior, their subjective norms (the
perceived expectations of important others concerning performance of the
behavior), and their perceptions of behavioral control (the extent to which they
beheve they have control over performing the behavior). These variables combine
to determine an individual's intention to perform a given behavior, which, in turn,
influences the behavioral outcome.
Fazio (1990) makes the claim that decision processes may be quite
different in the case of attitudes which have been activated simply upon the mere
observation of the attitude object. In his MODE model (i.e., Motivation and
Opportunity as DEterminants of which processing mode will operate), Fazio
makes a distinction between two types of processing modes: the automatic (or
spontaneous) mode and the reasoned (or deliberative) mode. According to Fazio,
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in order to function in the reasoned mode an individual must have the motivation
and opportunity to retrieve or construct an appropriate attitude. In the automatic
mode, on the other hand, attitudes mainly affect behavior by determining how an
individual defines an event; Fazio holds that in the automatic mode attitudes color
the manner in which people perceive a situation, making their perceptions more
consistent with their attitude. Given that these resulting perceptions are
congruent with attitudes, it is likely that an individual will produce attitudinally
consistent behaviors. Thus according to Fazio's model, attitudes serve to mediate
perceptions in the automatic mode of processing.
Fazio and his colleagues have conducted a number of studies in an attempt
to examine the processing involved in the automatic activation of attitudes. The
likelihood of an attitude's automatic activation, Fazio contends, depends on the
chronic accessibility of the attitude, in other words, the extent to which the object
and the evaluation are associated in memory. The more accessible an attitude,
the more likely it will influence perception of the event and, through that
perception, subsequent behavior. In a study by Fazio, Powell, and Williams
(1989), subjects were asked to respond to the names of 100 products, including ten
target items, by pressing a "like" or "dislike" button on the computer. This initial
phase provided the experimenters with the subjects' latencies for the ten target
items, and a basis for determining the accessibility of their attitudes toward those
items. Subjects then made ratings of the 100 items on a 7-point scale which
served as an attitude measure. Behavioral data were obtained by showing subjects
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a table upon which had been placed the ten target items and allowing them to
select five of the products as reimbursement for participating in the study. The
experimenters found that the more accessible subjects' attitudes toward a given
item, based on the latencies of responses made to each product on the computer,
the more likely it was that their item selection behavior was consistent with their
attitudes. A major question then arises as to what variables affect an attitude's
level of accessibility. One possible moderating factor of attitude-behavior
consistency proposed and studied by Fazio and his colleagues, has been the role of
direct experience in the formation of attitudes (Fazio & Zanna, 1978a, 1978b;
Sherman et al., 1982; Regan & Fazio, 1977). A number of studies have shown
that prediction of behavior from self-reported attitudes tends to be stronger when
the attitude is based on direct experience rather than on second-hand information.
In a study by Regan and Fazio (1977), subjects were exposed to a number of
different types of puzzles by either working through examples of the puzzles
themselves (direct experience condition) or by having examples of the puzzles
explained to them by the experimenter (indirect experience condition). All
subjects indicated their attitudes toward each type of puzzle and then were given
the opportunity to work the puzzles during a "free play" period. The
experimenters found that subjects who had had direct experience with the puzzles
prior to the free play situation showed greater consistency between their attitudes
and their free play behavior than did subjects in the indirect experience condition.
These findings correspond to another set of studies conducted by Fazio in which
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he found that subjects responded more quickly in a reaction-time task to questions
about their attitudes when those attitudes had been based on direct behavioral
experience rather than indirect experience (Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983). Fazio
suggests that direct experience both facilitates the attitude formation process and
increases attitude accessibihty once the attitude is formed. Yet accessibility may
not be the only factor coming into play in direct experience. Attitudes based on
direct experience rely on more accurate information, so they are better defined,
held with more confidence, and therefore more stable over time. These factors
have not been held constant in Fazio's work. It is possible that the stability of the
attitude may be responsible for the moderating effect of direct experience on the
attitude-behavior relation rather than accessibility (see Doll & Ajzen, 1992).
The MODE model suggests that type of experience with an attitude object
(direct vs. indirect experience) should moderate the attitude-behavior relation
primarily in the automatic processing mode. Based on Fazio's work with
accessibility, it should be under these circumstances that attitudes formed via
direct experience will be automatically activated, whereas those attitudes formed
via indirect experience will not be activated. In the reasoned action mode, Fazio's
MODE model predicts that attitudes based on direct experience rather than
indirect experience will show no significant differences in their attitude-behavior
relations due to the controlled processes involved with this mode; automatic
activation should not play an important role in this mode.
4
some
Ajzen has recently begun constructing a new model which makes
predictions opposite from Fazio's model (Doll & Ajzen, 1992; Ajzen, 1993).
Ajzen predicts that in the reasoned action mode, individuals consider all available
information regarding the attitude object. Attitudes that are formed by way of
direct experience are generally based on more accurate information regarding
behavioral consequences, expectations of important others, and difficulties
involved with the behavior than are those attitudes formed strictly on the basis of
indirect, or second-hand, experience. Given the increased accuracy of knowledge
gained from direct experience with an attitude object, these attitudes will tend to
be much more stable upon performance of the behavior, whereas attitudes formed
via indirect experience will be much more likely to change with the addition of
new information. In the automatic mode of processing, the advantages of direct
experience cannot be fully accessed due to lack of motivation or ability on the
part of an individual; the specific type of experience with the attitude object will
have much less of an effect on the attitude-behavior relation.
The following study was designed to test these two opposing sets of
predictions. The design of this study is very similar to the design used in the
Regan and Fazio (1977, study 2) study previously described, with the addition of a
second independent variable: level of cognitive load. Cognitive load was
manipulated by asking subjects to count the number of beeps they heard from a
tape recorder. The number of beeps subjects heard per minute was designed to
determine the level of cognitive load. This variable was included in order to
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restrict processing to the automatic mode in the high cognitive load condition so
that we could compare the attitude-behavior relation in this condition to the
relations in the low cognitive load and no cognitive load, or reasoned action,
conditions. Subjects were exposed to a set of five puzzles by either solving
examples of each type of puzzle themselves (direct experience condition) or
having the experimenter explain each type of puzzle to the subject (indirect
experience condition). Following their exposure to the puzzles, subjects
completed a questionnaire on the computer regarding their level of perceived
knowledge about each puzzle type, the individual aspects of the theory of planned
behavior (attitude toward the specific puzzle types, perceived behavioral control,
expectancies of important others, intentions), and their level of confidence
concerning their judgments. Latencies of subjects' responses to the questionnaire
were recorded by the computer.
Following completion of the questionnaire, subjects were given three
separate pages of each type of puzzle. They were told that they would have 15
minutes in which to attempt any of the puzzles they wish. They were asked to
number each item as it was attempted. The percentage of each type of puzzle
attempted and the order in which the puzzles were attempted served as our
behavioral measures. In the high and low cognitive load conditions, subjects were
advised that while they were working on the puzzles, beeping noises would be
emitted by a tape recorder located on the table next to them. They were asked to
keep track of the number of beeps they heard while working on the puzzles. In
6
order to be certain that subjects in the high cognitive load condition were not
behaving differently from subjects in the no cognitive load condition simply based
on the fact that they are completing an additional task, we included a low
cognitive load condition. Subjects in the high cognitive load condition heard a
significantly greater number of beeps than those in the low cognitive load
condition. Subjects in the no cognitive load condition did not hear any beeps.
Both the low and no cognitive load conditions served as our reasoned processing
modes, while the high cognitive load condition served as our automatic processing
mode. In order to assess the temporal stability of subjects' attitudes, following the
free play situation subjects were seated at the computer and again asked about
their attitudes toward each individual puzzle type.
This study tested two opposing sets of predictions. Both the Ajzen model
and Fazio's MODE model predict main effects of experience such that subjects in
the direct experience condition will display a significantly stronger
attitude-behavior relation than subjects in the indirect experience condition.
Additionally, the Ajzen model predicts a main effect of cognitive load, wherein
subjects in the low cognitive load and no cognitive load conditions, our reasoned
action conditions, will show a significantly stronger attitude-behavior relation than
subjects in the high cognitive load condition, our automatic processing condition.
The MODE model also predicts a main effect of load, but with subjects in the
high cognitive load condition showing a significantly stronger attitude-behavior
relation than subjects in the no and low cognitive load conditions. Finally, the
7
Ajzen model predicts an interaction effect such that direct experience will have
greater effects on the attitude-behavior relation for attitudes retrieved by subjects
under the low or no cognitive load conditions than for those attitudes retrieved by
subjects in the high cognitive load condition. The MODE model also predicts an
interaction effect, but wherein direct experience has a greater effect on the
attitude-behavior relation for attitudes retrieved by subjects under high cognitive
load conditions than for those attitudes retrieved under no and low cognitive load
conditions (see Figure 1).
8
D
0)
c
O CD
CO 13
CO o
2^ E
CO
E CD
o x>
CO E
LUN
<
(DO
c
0)
CL
X
LU
LU
LUQ
"O
CO
O
n
C
O (U
CO o
2 E
o
CO
E <D
O TD
CO E
O
N
<
LL
0)
o
c
Q)
Q.
X
LU
LU
LUQ
J3
=3
.2
O O
cd ca
(U (U
-a "a
p 3
(—1<
00
° S I(U o ?^2 cC (U
.
'C CI,
TD B
<u o o
cj c/3 3
-a
cd
CO
(U o C
bO D cd
CO
o
9
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
108 undergraduate students at the University of Massachusetts participated
in this experiment in partial fulfillment of class requirements. The participants
were assigned to one of six between-groups experimental conditions in a 2 (direct
vs. indirect experience) X 3 (high cognitive load vs. low cognitive load vs. no
cognitive load) design.
Procedure
Upon entering the experimental laboratory, subjects completed a consent
form describing the study in which they would be participating:
"You will be reviewing some puzzle exercises
for a new aptitude test that we are developing for a
masters project. You will be asked a number of
questions about the puzzles and then given a free-play
session where you may choose to complete any of the
puzzles you wish."
The experimenter told subjects in the high and low cognitive load
conditions that they would hear beeping noises coming from the tape recorder on
the table during the "free play" period. As a demonstration, a sixty-second portion
of each tape (high or low cognitive load) was played for subjects in the cognitive
load conditions.
The experimenter then presented subjects with samples of the five types of
problems included in this study. Puzzle materials were similar to those utilized in
10
a study by Regan and Fazio (1977, study 2). These materials consisted of five
types of puzzles: (1) word dials, in which the subject must identify the letter
missing from a word; (2) choosing a path, in which the subject must find the
correct path from a starting point, through a center point, to a finishing point; (3)
cube comparisons, in which the subject must determine whether a set of cubes is
identical; (4) squares, in which subjects must identify the word contained within a
square; and (5) gestalt completions, in which subjects must identify an object that
is only partially drawn (see Appendix A for examples of puzzles). Order of
presentation of the puzzles was randomized.
The experimenter gave five pages of problems one at a time to the
subjects. Each page presented examples of one type of problem and instructions
on how the puzzle was to be completed. For subjects in the direct experience
condition, the examples were left blank and the experimenter asked them to "get
acquainted" with each type of problem by solving the examples provided. Subjects
in the indirect experience condition viewed the same examples, but the examples
given to these subjects had already been completed. The experimenter attempted
to provide subjects with equivalent time for exposure to the puzzles in both
conditions. Subjects in the direct experience condition were told to "take about
three minutes" to solve the examples. Likewise, the experimenter spent three
minutes explaining and demonstrating the examples to subjects in the indirect
experience condition.
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Following exposure to all five types of problems, the experimenter left the
room and was replaced by a second experimenter who was blind to subjects'
experience condition. This procedure was used to avoid experimenter bias from
occurring due to the extensive interaction between the experimenter and the
subject during the experience manipulation.
The experimenter directed all subjects to answer a series of questions on
the computer regarding the problems they just completed. The experimenter
asked subjects to respond to the questions on the screen as quickly and as
accurately as possible. The experimenter advised subjects to rate the type of
puzzles they had just seen, not the specific examples that were given for each
puzzle type. The experimenter reminded subjects that, following the completion
of these questions, they would be allowed a period of time during which they
would be free to work on any of the puzzles they wish. All questions on the
computer were answered on 5-point scales.
The first question asked subjects how informed they felt about each type of
puzzle ("I feel very informed about how to work on puzzle X" very true-very
untrue). The next set of questions measured the variables contained within the
theory of planned behavior. The order of the variables was randomized.
Attitudes toward playing with each of the puzzles were measured by
means of two evaluative scales ("My working on puzzle X will be" extremely
pleasant-extremely unpleasant and extremely interesting-extremely boring).
Subjective norms were measured in the following manner: "The experimenter
12
would especially approve of my working on puzzle X", "The experimenter thinks I
should work especially on puzzle X", "People like me would most like to work on
puzzle X", and "My friends would especially approve of my working on puzzle X'
extremely likely-extremely unlikely Perceived behavioral control was measured by
means of two items ("For me, working on puzzle X will be" extremely
easy^xtremely difficult and "I will be able to work successfully on puzzle X'
extremely likely-extremely unlikely). Lastly, intention was measured by means of
two items ("I intend to work on puzzle X in the time provided" and "I am planning
to work on puzzle X the most often in the time provided" extremely
likely-extremely unlikely).
The last two questions asked subjects about their feelings of confidence
regarding their judgments about each of the puzzles and their overall evaluations
after receiving information about the puzzles ("I feel confident about my
judgments concerning puzzle X" and "I feel good about the idea of working on
these types of puzzles in the free play period" very true-very untrue).
The experimenter placed samples of the five types of puzzles accompanied
by the puzzle names next to the computer so that subjects were able to identify
the puzzle type referred to in the questions presented by the computer. The
computer presented each type of question five times in a row, once for each
puzzle type, along the 5-point rating scale. Each type of question was separated
by filler questions. The order of the presentation of the puzzle types for all
questions was randomized (see Appendix B).
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Following the completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter gave
subjects three separate sheets of each of the five types of puzzles. The
experimenter told subjects:
"You will have 15 minutes in which to work any
of the puzzles you choose. This is a totally free period
and you should not be worried about being able to
actually solve a puzzle. You should feel free to work
on any of the puzzles that you wish."
These last statements were included in order to prevent subjects from attempting
only those puzzles they felt they were likely to be able to complete successfully.
The experimenter asked the subjects to number each particular problem as it was
attempted.
The experimenter advised high and low cognitive load subjects that while
they were working on the puzzles, beeping noises would be emitted by a tape
recorder on the table next to them. Subjects in the high and low load conditions
were told:
"As part of the aptitude test we are developing,
we are looking at how well people are able to perform
two tasks at the same time. We would like you to
keep track of the number of beeps you hear coming
from the tape recorder on the table while working on
the puzzles. I will be asking you to tell me the number
of beeps that you heard at the end of this 15 minute
period."
The high cognitive load subjects heard significantly more beeps than the low
cognitive load subjects (approximately 9 beeps per minute vs. 6 beeps per minute).
The experimenter pretested specific rates of beeps per minute in order to ensure
14
full cognitive load in the high cognitive load subjects. Subjects in the no cognitive
load condition did not hear any beeps.
Following these instructions, the experimenter allowed the subject to work
on the puzzles for 15 minutes. The free play session provided the experimenter
with two measures of behavior: the percentage of each type of problem
attempted, as well as the order in which subjects attempted the different types of
puzzles.
In order to obtain a measure of the temporal stability of subjects' attitudes
toward the individual puzzles, the experimenter asked subjects to return to the
computer after the free play session to answer questions similar to those presented
in the first questionnaire regarding their attitude towards playing with each of the
individual puzzles and their level of enjoyment during the free play period.
Following the completion of this second questionnaire, the experimenter
thoroughly debriefed the subjects.
15
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
2 (direct experience vs. indirect experience) x 3 (no cognitive load vs. low
cognitive load vs. high cognitive load) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used
to test the primary hypotheses of this study. These two sets of hypotheses are as
follows: the Ajzen model predicts that (1) attitudes based on direct experience will
predict behavior better than attitudes formed through indirect experience, (2) the
attitude-behavior relation will be stronger for subjects in the no and low cognitive
load conditions than for subjects in the high cognitive load condition, and (3) the
effects of direct experience on the attitude-behavior relation will be greater for
attitudes retrieved under no or low cognitive load than for attitudes retrieved
under high cognitive load; Fazio's MODE model predicts that (1) attitudes based
on direct experience will predict behavior better than attitudes formed through
indirect experience, (2) the attitude-behavior relation will be stronger for subjects
in the high cognitive load condition than for subjects in the no and low cognitive
load conditions, and (3) the effects of direct experience on the attitude-behavior
relation will be greater for attitudes retrieved under high cognitive load than for
attitudes retrieved under no or low cognitive load (see Figure 1). The percentage
of each type of puzzle attempted, as well as the order in which subjects attempted
each type of puzzle served as the dependent variables in these analyses.
16
Preliminary An^lyQ^s
Cognitive Tr>aH
This study differs from the Regan and Fazio (1977) study mainly due to the
inclusion of a second independent variable: cognitive load. In order to
conceptualize the automatic processing mode, subjects in the high cognitive load
condition were exposed to a greater number of beeps than subjects in both the no
and low cognitive load conditions.
Based on pretesting, subjects in the low cognitive load condition received
approximately 6 beeps per minute for a total of 88 beeps (subject M = 87.889),
while subjects in the high cognitive load condition received approximately 9 beeps
per minute for a total of 114 beeps (subject M = 118.333). The number of beeps
that busy subjects reported hearing was compared to the actual number of beeps
played. The average error rate was 7.6% for subjects in the low cognitive load
condition and 13.2% for subjects in the high cognitive load condition. The
acceptable error rate in other cognitive load experiments has been 15% (Gilbert,
Krull, & Pelham, 1988).
Level of Information
To rule out possible artifacts due to differing amounts of information
subjects may have had regarding the different puzzle types, a 2 (type of
experience) X 3 (level of cognitive load) ANOVA was performed on subjects'
self-reports of how informed they felt about each type of puzzle after having
17
received the direct or indirect experience manipulation. A significant main effect
of Experience F(l, 102) = 13.132, p<.000, was found (see Figure 2). Subjects in
the indirect experience condition felt more informed than subjects in the direct
experience condition (M = 4.33 vs. 3.87). This difference was nonsignificant in
both the no and low cognitive load conditions (Indirect Experience M = 4.30,
Direct Experience M = 3.99; t(34) = 1.422, ns; Indirect Experience M = 4.26,
Direct Experience M = 3.97, t(34) = 1.33, ns) but was highly significant in the
high load condition (Indirect Experience M = 4.43, Direct Experience M = 3.67;
t(34) = 3.486, p<.01). T-tests were adjusted with Scheffe's procedure in order to
control for family-wise error rate. The finding that indirect experience subjects
felt more informed about the puzzles than direct experience subjects was
unexpected. In Regan and Fazio's (1977) study, they found no differences
between direct and indirect experience subjects in how informed they felt about
the various types of puzzles. It is possible that because indirect experience
subjects had only superficial exposure to the puzzles, they were not fully aware of
any intracacies involved in solving the puzzles. Therefore, indirect experience
subjects were not reticent to indicate that they felt informed about the puzzles.
Alternatively, direct experience subjects, having had first-hand experience with the
puzzles, may have felt more aware of any gaps in their knowledge about the
puzzles, and therefore indicated feeling less informed.
18
Level of Information
Informed
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-
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Cognitive Load
• Direct Experience
* Indirect Experience
Figure 2. Level of Information. Measure of how informed subjects felt
after receiving the experience manipulation.
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Confidence
Based on the research of Fazio and Zanna (1978b) we expected to find a
main effect of experience on subjects' reported confidence in their judgments such
that direct experience subjects would report being more confident than indirect
experience subjects. This is, in fact, what we found. A 2 (type of experience) X 3
(level of cognitive load) ANOVA performed on subjects' reported level of
confidence in their judgments regarding each of the puzzle types revealed a main
effect of experience F(l, 102) = 9.054, p<.003, with direct experience subjects
reporting higher levels of confidence than indirect experience subjects (M = 3.86
vs. M = 3.48) (see Figure 3). Although the overall Experience x Cognitive Load
interaction was not significant F(2,102) = 1.209, p<.303, type of experience had a
marginally significant effect only in the no cognitive load condition, wherein direct
experience subjects reported being more confident in their judgments than indirect
experience subjects (Direct Experience M = 3.99, Indirect Experience M = 3.48;
t(34) = 2.80, p<.06).
The finding that direct experience subjects felt more confident than indirect
experience subjects is consistent with past research, although it seems somewhat at
odds with the results previously reported regarding how informed the subjects felt.
Those results indicated that direct experience subjects felt significantly less
well-informed than indirect experience subjects.
20
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Confidence
3.8
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• Direct Experience
^ Indirect Experience
Figure 3. Confidence. Effects of experience and cognitive load
subjects' levels of confidence in their own judgments.
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Accessibility nf Att.-fii^f.c;
Filler Items
Filler items were included in the pre- and posttest questionnaires in order
to control error variance due to individual differences in speed of responding that
were unrelated to accessibility (Fazio, 1990). The distributions of subjects'
response latencies were found to be positively skewed, so we followed the
procedure suggested by Fazio (1990) and subjected the recorded latencies to
logarithmic transformations. All data analyses were performed on the
transformed scores.
A 2 X 3 X 2 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the filler
latencies, with type of experience and cognitive load as between-subject factors
and time of measurement (pre- or posttest questionnaire) as a within-subjects
factor revealed a main effect of Time (1,102) = 3.94, p<.05, as well as a
significant Experience x Time interaction F(l,102) = 8.87, p<.004. The main
effect of Time is most likely due to practice effects, as examination of subjects
response times indicate longer latencies on the pretest than the posttest (M =
1.477 vs. M = 1.443) Filler latencies differed significantly by type of experience
only on the pretest (Direct Experience M = 1.5297 vs. Indirect Experience M =
1.4245); mean latencies were virtually equal on the posttest (Direct Experience M
= 1.443 vs. Indirect Experience M = 1.442). These results were unexpected, for
the filler items were designed to be irrelevant to the puzzle task, used only to
control for individual differences, so it is unclear why type of experience should
22
have had a significant effect on subjects' filler latencies on the pretest.
Nevertheless, once all of the subjects had an opportunity to work on the puzzles
during the free play period, this difference disappeared.
Attitude Ilems
Based on past research (Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983), we expected to find
a main effect of experience on attitude accessibility, with direct experience
subjects responding more quickly than subjects in the indirect experience
condition.
To obtain an overall measure of attitude accessibility, the logarithms of the
response latencies for the two indicators of attitude were averaged across the five
puzzles. Before averaging the two attitude measures, we tested for internal
consistency. A between-subjects analysis was used to test for consistency because
only one averaged response latency measure was available for each subject. The
correlation between attitude measures on the pretest was .7365 (p<.01) and on
the posttest was .6241 (p<.01).
A 2 (type of experience) X 3 (level of cognitive load) X 2 (time of
measurement) MANOVA was was performed to test the effects of type of
experience and cognitive load on the accessibilty of subjects' attitudes. The
dependent variable in the analysis was the mean latency of subjects' attitude
responses toward the five puzzle types. Significant main effects of Experience
F(l,102) = 5.38, p<.022, and Time F(l,102) = 57.68, p<.000, were revealed. The
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main effect of Experience indicated that direct experience subjects showed
somewhat lon^ response latencies than indirect experience subjects (M = 1.218
vs. 1.088). These results were unexpected, as work by Fazio, Powell, and Herr
(1983) demonstrated shorter response latencies for subjects with direct experience
rather than indirect experience. The main effect of Time indicated that all
subjects showed longer mean response latencies on the pretest than on the
posttest (M = 1.267 vs. 1.038). As discussed earlier, it is likely that subjects
response times shortened on the posttest simply due to practice effects.
The same analysis was conducted with filler latencies treated as a covariate
in order to control for systematic differences as well as for individual differences in
responding. Controlling for differences in filler latencies produced similar results
to the previous analysis: a main effect of Experience F(l,101) = 3.94, p<.05, with
direct experience subjects responding slower than indirect experience subjects, and
a main effect of Time F(l, 101) = 57.68, p<.000, with mean adjusted response
latencies being longer during the pretest than the posttest.
Summary
This study found a main effect of Time as well as an Experience x Time
interaction on subjects' response latencies to the filler items. Overall, subjects
responded more slowly on the pretest than on the posttest. This effect is most
likely due to practice effects. Filler latencies differed by type of experience only
on the pretest, with subjects in the indirect experience condition responding more
24
quickly than the direct experience subjects. Once subjects in the direct and
indirect conditions were allowed the chance to work on the puzzles themselves
(i.e., direct experience), this difference disappeared.
In addition, main effects of Time and Experience on the accessibility of
subjects' attitudes were found, even when filler latencies were treated as a
covariate. Subjects took longer to respond to questions on the pretest than to
questions on the posttest. As suggested above, this effect may simply be a case of
practice effects. More unexpected though, is the finding that indirect experience
subjects responded more quickly than direct experience subjects. Previous studies
have demonstrated shorter response latencies for direct experience subjects as
compared to subjects with indirect experience and, in fact, the opposite result was
found in the present study.
Temporal Stability of Attitudes
The temporal stability of subjects' attitudes was assessed with respect to
two dependent variables: a global attitude measure toward the puzzles and a
specific measure of attitudes toward each individual puzzle. We expected that
subjects in the direct experience condition would display more stable attitudes
toward the puzzles than subjects in the indirect experience condition.
The temporal stability of subjects' global attitudes was assessed by
computing the absolute difference between subjects' overall evaluations on the
pre- and posttest questionnaires. A 2 (type of experience) X 3 (level of cognitive
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load) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Experience, F(l, 102) = 9.336, p<.003
(see Figure 4). Overall, the global attitudes of subjects in the indirect experience
condition were more stable than those of subjects in the direct experience
condition (M = .33 vs.
.72), scores closer to zero being more stable. This
difference was marginally significant in the high load condition (Indirect
Experience M = .28, Direct Experience M =
.89; t(34) = 2.77, p<.07). The
results of the mood measure were not consistent with our predictions yet, similar
to the results found with subjects' reported levels of information regarding the
puzzles, the greatest difference between subjects in the direct and indirect
experience conditions occurred under high cognitive load conditions.
The temporal stability of subjects' specific attitudes towards the different
puzzles was assessed by computing the within-subject correlations between the
pre- and posttest measures of subjects' attitudes across the five puzzles^. All
statistical analyses involving these stabilities were performed after the correlations
had been submitted to Fisher's r-to-z transformation. A 2 (type of experience) x 3
(level of cognitive load) ANOVA again revealed a main effect of Experience,
F(l,78) = 6.518, p<.013 (see Figure 5). However, in this case subjects in the
direct experience condition displayed more stable attitudes than subjects in the
indirect experience condition (M = .87 vs.
.51), scores closer to one being more
stable. This difference was particularly evident in the high cognitive load
^ We were unable to use within-subject correlations for the
analysis of our global attitude measure as we had taken
only one set of measures per subject.
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General Attitude Stability
Absolute Difference of Attitude Measures
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2' 1
No Low High
Cognitive Load
• Direct Experience
* Indirect Experience
Figure 4. General Attitude Stability. Effects of experience and cognitive
load on subjects' general attitudes. Values closer to zero indicate less
change.
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condition, although the results did not reach significance (Indirect Experience M
= .33, Direct Experience M =
.91; z = 2.639, p<.10). These analyses are
consistent with our hypothesis that subjects who have direct experience with an
attitude object develop more stable attitudes than subjects who have indirect
experience. Again we see a similar pattern of results to those shown by the
general evaluation and level of information variables, namely a distinct separation
between the direct and indirect experience subjects occurring only under
conditions of high cognitive load.
Attitude-Behavior Relatinn
Our primary hypothesis concerned the effects of type of experience and
level of cognitive load on the relation between subjects' attitudes and their
subsequent behavior. This study was designed to test the opposing hypotheses
proposed by Ajzen and Fazio's models. Both models predict a main effect of
experience such that subjects in the direct experience condition will display a
significantly stronger attitude-behavior relation than subjects in the indirect
experience condition. Ajzen's model also predicts a main effect of cognitive load,
wherein subjects in the no and low cognitive load conditions will show a
significantly stronger attitude-behavior relation than subjects in the high cognitive
load condition. Fazio's MODE model also predicts a main effect of load, but with
subjects in the high cognitive load condition showing a stronger attitude-behavior
relation than subjects in the no and low cognitive load conditions. Finally, the
28
Attitude Stability
Correlation Between Attitudes
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
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Cognitive Load
• Direct Experience
* Indirect Experience
Figure 5. Attitude Stability. Correlations between pre- and posttest
attitudes. Values closer to one indicate less change.
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Ajzen model predicts an interaction such that direct experience will have a greater
effect on the attitude-behavior relation for attitudes retrieved under no and low
cognitive load conditions than for those attitudes retrieved under high cognitive
load conditions. Again, Fazio's model also predicts an interaction effect between
cognitive load and type of experience, but wherein direct experience has a greater
effect on the attitude-behavior relation for attitudes retrieved under high load
conditions than for attitudes retrieved under no and low cognitive load conditions
(see Figure 1).
The attitude-behavior relation was assessed by computing the within-subject
correlations of attitude and behavior across the five puzzle types. Separate
correlations were computed for each of the dependent measures of puzzle
behavior: order in which the puzzles were completed, and percentage of each
type of puzzle completed. All statistical analyses involving these correlations were
performed after the correlations had been submitted to Fisher's r-to-z
transformation.
The transformed attitude-behavior correlations were submitted to a 2 (type
of experience) X 3 (level of cognitive load) ANOVA. The analysis involving the
relation between attitudes and order of puzzle completion produced a main effect
of Experience F(l,85) = 4.991, p<.028, and a significant interaction F(2,85) =
3.279, p<.042 (see Figure 6). Analysis of the correlation between attitudes and
the percentage of each type of puzzle completed by subjects produced a similar,
though nonsignificant, pattern of results (Experience x Load interaction F(2, 85) =
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1.542, p<.220; Figure 7). Contrary to both models, there was no main effect of
cognitive load with either dependent variable (F < 1). Consistent with predictions
derived from Fazio and Ajzen, subjects in the direct experience condition
displayed stronger attitude-behavior relations than did subjects in the indirect
experience condition (puzzle order: M = .41 vs.
.16; percentage of puzzles: M =
.61 vs. .51). The effect due to experience was particularly evident in the high
cognitive load condition (puzzle order: Direct Experience M =
.51, Indirect
Experience M = -.12; percentage of puzzles: Direct Experience M =
.65, Indirect
Experience M =
.23), although these differences did not reach statistical
significance (puzzle order: z = 1.666, ns; percentage of puzzles: z = 1.32, ns).
These interactions support Fazio's model. The results concerning the strength of
the attitude-behavior relation demonstrate a trend similar to the results of other
analyses in this study; the greatest differences between the direct and indirect
experience conditions are produced under high cognitive load.
Mediation
Past research has found a stronger attitude-behavior relation when attitudes
are based on direct experience rather than indirect experience (Fazio & Zanna,
1978a, 1978b; Regan & Fazio, 1977). This main effect of experience is presented
in the previous section. Fazio and his associates (Fazio, 1990; Fazio, Chen,
McDonel, & Sherman, 1982; Fazio & Williams, 1986) have suggested that the
effects of experience on the attitude-behavior relation are mediated by the
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Attitude-Behavior Relation
Order of Puzzle Completion
0.6
Attitude-Behavior Correlation
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Cognitive Load
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• Direct Experience
^^ Indirect Experience
Figure 6. Attitude-Behavior Relation: Order of Puzzle Completion.
Correlations between pretest attitudes and subsequent behavior as
related to experience and cognitive load.
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Attitude-Behavior Relation
Percentage of Each Puzzle Type
Attitude-Behavior Correlation
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~
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Figure 7. Attitude-Behavior Relation: Percentage of Each Puzzle Type.
Correlations between pretest attitudes and subsequent behavior as
related to experience and cognitive load.
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attitude's accessibility in memory. Contraiy to Fazio, et al., Doll and Ajzen (1992)
have found that the temporal stabilities of the predictor variables, rather than
their accessibility, serve as strong mediators of the attitude-behavior relation.
In order to test for a mediating role of attitude stability in the present
study, the transformed attitude-behavior correlations were submitted to 2 (type of
experience) x 3 (level of cognitive load) MANOVAs with temporal stability of
subjects' attitudes treated as a covariate. Attitude stability was measured by
computing the within-subject correlations between the pre- and posttest measures
of subjects' attitudes across the five puzzles. Baron and Kenny (1986) have
suggested that if, as a result of controlling for a possible mediating variable, the
effect of an independent variable upon a dependent variable is reduced to
nonsignificance, then mediation can be assumed. Initially, the correlation between
attitude and order of puzzle completion produced a main effect of Experience and
an Experience x Cognitive Load interaction. Controlling for attitude stability
eliminated the main effect of Experience F(l, 76) = 1.04, p<.312, although the
interaction remained significant F(l, 76)) = 3.90, p<.025. The relation between
attitude and percentage of each type of puzzle completed was not significant in
the initial analysis so possible mediating effects of stability could not be
established. It is unclear why stability served to eliminate the main effect of
Experience involving order of puzzle completion, while not diminishing the
Experience x Cognitive Load interaction, but it appears that stability is not the
only variable mediating subjects' attitude-behavior relations.
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Predictions of Tntentinn. ^nrj Pehnvinr
Although not directly relevant to our hypothesis, we examined the ability of
the theory of planned behavior to predict game behavior and intentions across
experimental conditions. Three average within-subject correlation matrices, two
for behavior and one for intentions, were submitted to multiple regression
analyses. Both the percentage of each type of puzzle completed, as well as the
order in which subjects worked on the puzzles, were regressed on the pretest
measures of perceived behavioral control and intentions. Subjects' intentions to
play with the puzzles were regressed on pretest attitudes, subjective norms, and
perceived behavioral control.
After testing for internal consistency, the multiple indicators for each of the
variables of the theory of planned behavior were averaged to produce overall
measures of subjects' behavioral intentions, subjective norms, general attitudes,
and perceived behavioral control. These variables were submitted to multiple
regression analyses.
The results of the multiple regression analyses provide good support for the
theory of planned behavior. In the prediction of percentage of each type of
puzzle completed, the multiple correlation was .66 (p<.0000), with both intentions
(b = 1.04, p<.0000) and perceptions of behavioral control (b =
-.58, p<.0008)
making significant contributions to prediction. When order of puzzle completions
served as the dependent variable, the multiple correlation was .29 (p<.07). The
marginal result for order is not surprising, as the pretest questions assessing
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intention and perceived behavioral control related to preferences tor working on
the different puzzles, not the particular order in which the subject would choose to
work.
When predicting intention, the multiple correlation was .94 (p<.0000) with
perceived behavioral control (b =
.38, p<.0001) and attitude (b =
.58, p<.0000)
making significant contributions to prediction. The third variable, subjective
norms, did not enter significantly into the regression equation (b =
.07, p<.43).
Due to the fact that the intention we were predicting related to puzzle choice, it is
reasonable to assume that subjects' beliefs concerning important others'
expectations regarding their behavior may not have been particularly relevant in
this situation. Overall, though, the theory of planned behavior served as a good
framework for predicting both intentions and behaviors.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study was an attempt to examine the effects of direct vs.
indirect experience on the attitude-behavior relation in the automatic and
reasoned modes of processing information. We presented two opposing theories
concerning the influence of type of experience on subsequent attitude-behavior
relations. The Ajzen and Fazio models both predicted a main effect of
Experience such that subjects in the direct experience condition would show a
significantly stronger attitude-behavior relation than subjects in the indirect
experience condition, and this effect was found. Both the Ajzen and Fazio models
predicted a main effect of Cognitive Load. This effect was not found. Finally,
both models predicted an Experience x Cognitive Load interaction, but whereas
the Ajzen model predicted that direct experience would have a greater effect on
the attitude-behavior relation for attitudes retrieved under no and low cognitive
load conditions, Fazio's model predicted that direct experience would have a
greater effect on attitudes retrieved under high cognitive load conditions. The
interaction found lends support to Fazio's model; attitude-behavior relations were
found to be highest for direct experience subjects in the high cognitive load
condition. It must be noted, however, that while significant results were found in
the high cognitive load condition, our automatic processing condition, the attitude-
behavior relations of our direct and indirect experience subjects did not differ in
the no and low cognitive load conditions, our reasoned action conditions. These
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findings are contrary to past research examining the effects of type of experience
in the reasoned mode of processing (Doll & Ajzen, 1992; Fazio, Powell, & Herr,
1983;Regan & Fazio, 1977). These studies found that direct experience improved
the prediction of behavior and lowered latencies of responses to questionnaire
items. Those findings were not replicated in the present study. It is possible that
the instructions given to indirect experience subjects in the present study were
sufficiently informative to eliminate actual differences in the attitude-behavior
relations between direct and indirect experience subjects in the reasoned mode.
These differences may have only had the chance to appear when subjects were
placed under conditions of high cognitive load, our automatic mode of processing.
Another possible explanation for the discrepancy between previous findings and
our results is that the methods of previous studies may inadvertantly placed
subjects in a state of distraction or stress, making these studies more similar to our
high cognitive load condition. If this were the case, our results would be
consistent with past studies.
Fazio and his associates (Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982; Fazio,
Powell, & Herr, 1983; Sherman, et al., 1982) have suggested that the primary
variable mediating the effects of experience is the accessibility of subjects'
attitudes. In these studies, accessibility has been conceptualized as the latency of
subjects' responses to attitudinal questions. Their findings have indicated that
subjects who had received direct experience regarding an attitude object
responded more quickly to questions concerning that object than subjects who had
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a main
received indirect experience. This was not the case in the present study.
Controlling for individual differences in filler latencies, analyses revealed
effect of Time wherein subjects' latencies were longer on the pretest than the
posttest, and a main effect of Experience wherein direct experience subjects
responded more slowly than indirect experience subjects. The main effect of Time
can most likely be attributed to an overall practice effect, but it is unclear why
direct experience subjects responded more slowly than indirect subjects to
attitudinal questions regarding the puzzles. One possibility is that direct
experience subjects may have felt more involved in the task, and therefore took
more time to answer the questions. In future research, the inclusion of a question
concerning how involved subjects feel with the task would prove useful.
Regardless, although the analysis of the attitude-behavior relation data seem to
support Fazio's general theory, accessibility, at least in the present study, does not
appear to be the crucial mediating variable of the effects of experience.
Ajzen and Doll (1992) have suggested that, rather than accessibihty,
stability of the attitude serves as an important mediating variable of the effect of
experience on the attitude-behavior relation. Using a strategy suggested by Baron
and Kenny (1986), the effects of cognitive load and type of experience on the
attitude-behavior relation were examined while controlling for attitude stability.
Results indicated that although stability reduced and even eliminated some of the
previously significant effects, it was not able to reduce all of the effects to
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nonsignificance. Thus, accessibility and stability as well other possible mediators
such as confidence should be examined further in future research.
One puzzling finding in the present study was that indirect experience
subjects felt more informed about the puzzles than direct experience subjects.
Under conditions similar to our no and low cognitive load condition, Regan and
Fazio (1977) found no difference between subjects in the direct and indirect
experience conditions in how informed they felt about the various types of puzzles.
A possible explanation presented earlier suggests that because indirect experience
subjects had only superficial exposure to the puzzles, they would not have been
fully aware of the intracacies involved in solving the puzzles. Therefore, indirect
experience subjects were not reticent to indicate that they felt informed about the
puzzles. Alternatively, direct experience subjects, having had first-hand experience
with the puzzles, felt more aware of the gaps in their knowledge about the
puzzles, and therefore indicated feeling less informed. It would have been useful
if we had included a follow-up question on the posttest questionnaire regarding
how informed subjects felt about the puzzles. This information might have
allowed us to examine whether differences based on initial experience with the
puzzles persisted once all subjects had received direct experience with the puzzles.
Further research should be directed at the placement of the cognitive load
manipulation within the experimental paradigm. It would be interesting if the
cognitive load manipulation could have been delivered during the recording of
subjects' attitudinal responses on the computer. Our manipulation was given.
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instead, during the behavioral response period, as it was determined that the
cognitive load manipulation could overly interfere with the recording of subjects'
response latencies. In future, latency measures could be recorded separately from
the attitudinal measures as in the work by Fazio, Powell, and Williams (1989).
Fazio et al. recorded subjects' response latencies by asking them to respond as
quickly as possible to a simple "like - dislike" judgment concerning the attitude
objects. Following this task, subjects completed a second questionnaire asking
them to make attitudinal ratings on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely bad to
extremely good. This type of procedure would allow us to examine the relation
between attitudes and behavior when the initial attitudes were generated under
conditions of cognitive load.
In sum, the results of the present study suggest that direct experience plays
an important role in strengthening subjects' attitude
-behavior relations, particularly
in the automatic processing mode. The results are encouraging with respect to
our ability to examine the automatic processing mode in the laboratory. Further
research must be conducted in order to explore the variables mediating the effects
of experience.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF PUZZLES
CHOOSING A PATH
ng
through the circle lul V' ?^ ^""^ ^° the line form S
five goxes ^n^ one box l?n' kI^^N^^ '""^ ^^^^"^^ ^^^^i';
circle, and bac/to th^ F i^ the sL^ i'"' "^^^ ^' ^'^^^^^^the only places where rnnnrn^? °" ^''^ ^^^^^ show
lines orcros3 Jhe^^^^^^ ^ -es . if
between the lines ' ^^""^ "° connection
lO
f
WORD DIALS
Each word dial below contains a word, but one letter is missing.
Vmen you determine the missing letter, enter it into the center of th
dial. Then you will be able to spell a word in a clockwise direction
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CUBE COMPARISONS
In each problem examine the naii- r^f
Z7I ZF.
s a Dcu
SQUARES
Each of the squares contains an 8-letter word. It can hefound by starting at one of the letters and reading either cWV„-or counterclockwi i.rv.«„ u , '-•^ uj.ug n lockwis
nn t-h^
/c-L tcwise. When you have determined the word, write ito he line provided beneath the puzzle.
V I E
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E N K
ERA
T R
I L Y
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GESTALT COMPLETION
picture'e%en ^hoSgh it ITloflll''^ - wholeto uee your imagiStlon ?o ?urin ti:'^'^f""- ^«Look at each incomnr«+P ^i.^ in he miecing oartB.
Write on the Une bJnelth '"^ '° ^^^^ i^-
what the picture ia! ^ ''^'^'^ °^ ^ ^<^^<3s telling
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE*
I feel very informed about how to work on gestalt completions:12345
very
untrue
I feel very informed about how to work on letter series:1234
very
untrue
very
true
very
true
I feel very informed about how to work on cube comparisons:12345
very very
untrue true
I feel very informed about how to work on choosing a path:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
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I feel very informed about how to work on nearer point:12345
very
' very
untrue
true
I like to spend time playing outside:12345
very
untrue
The idea of playing outside to me is:1234 5
extremely extremely
unpleasant pleasant
Working on gestalt completions will be:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unpleasant pleasant
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Working on letter series will be:
1 2
extremely
unpleasant
extremely
pleasant
Working on cube comparisons will be:
1 2
extremely
unpleasant
extremely
pleasant
Working on choosing a path will be:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unpleasant pleasant
Working on nearer point will be:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unpleasant pleasant
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I find my classes at school to be:
1 2 3
extremely
unpleasant
I think that my classwork is:
1 2 3 4 5
^^^^^"^^^y
extremely
^^^^^^"It
easy
Working on gestalt completions will be:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
boring interesting
Working on letter series will be:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
boring interesting
extremely
pleasant
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Working on cube comparisons will be:
1 2
extremely
boring
Working on choosing a path will be:12345
"^^'^"^^^y
extremely
interesting
Working on nearer point will be:1234 5
extremely
extremely
t>oring interesting
I have had a lot of previous experience working on a computer:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
extremely
interesting
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Working on the computer for me is;12345
extremely
extremely
unpleasant
pleasant
The experimenter would especially approve of my working on gestalt completions:12345
^^^^"^^^y
extremely
unlikely j.j^^j^
The experimenter would especially approve of my working on letter series:12345
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
The experimenter would especially approve of my working on cube comparisons:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
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The experimenter would especially approve of my working on choosing a path:12345
extremely
^ extremely
"""^^^y
likely
The experimenter would especially approve of my working on nearer point:12345
^'^^^^"^^ly
extremely
unlikely
Uj^^jy
I am happy that I chose to attend UMASS:1234 5
very very
untrue true
I feel that I am getting a very good education at UMASS:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
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The experimenter thinks I should work especially on gestalt completions:12345
extremely
^ extremely
"""^^^y
likely
The experimenter thinks I should work especially on letter series:12345
^^^'^"^^^y
extremely
unlikely j.j^^jy
The experimenter thinks I should work especially on cube comparisons:12345
extremely
extremely
unlikely likely
The experimenter thinks I should work especially on choosing a path:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
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The experimenter thinks I should work especially on nearer point:12 3 4 5
extremely
^ extremely
^""^^^y
likely
I think that the weather in Massachusetts is very nice:
1 2 3 4 5
very
untrue
t^^^
I would like to live in Massachusetts after I graduate from school:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
People like me would most like to work on gestalt completions:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
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People like me would most like to work on letter series:
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
People like me would most like to work on cube comparisons:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
People like me would most like to work on choosing a path:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
People like me would most like to work on nearer point:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
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I feel that I am getting the grades I deserve in my classes:1234
very
untrue
5
very
true
The idea of studying to me is:
1 2
extremely
unpleasant
extremely
pleasant
My friends would especially approve of my working on gestalt completions:1234 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
My friends would especially approve of my working on letter series:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
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My friends would especially approve of my working on cube comparisons:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely^
extremely
unlikely
j.j^^j^
My friends would especially approve of my working on choosing a path:
1 2 3 4 5
^'^tremely
extremely
unlikely
lil^^ly
My friends would especially approve of my working on nearer point:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
I am the type of person who worries about the grades they get in class:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
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I find that I already know a lot of the material that is covered in my classes
very
untrue
5
very
true
For me, working on gestalt completions will be:
1 2 3
extremely
difficult
extremely
easy
For me, working on letter series will be:
1 2 3
extremely
difficult
extremely
easy
For me, working on cube comparisons will be:
1 2 3
extremely
difficult
extremely
easy
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For me, working on choosing a path will be:
1 2 3
extremely
difficult
easy
For me, working on nearer point will be:
1 2 3 4 5
^'^^^^"^^^y
extremely
d^ffic"!^
easy
I spend a lot of time talking with my friends:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
I like to spend a lot of time by myself:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
extremely
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I will be able to work successfully on gestalt compl
1 2 3
extremely
unlikely
etions:
4
extremely
likely
I will be able to work successfully on letter series:
1 2 3
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
I will be able to work successfully on cube comparisons:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
I will be able to work successfully on choosing a path:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
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I will be able to work successfully on nearer point:12345
extremely
extremely
unlikely
,., ,
likely
I find that my mind wanders when I am doing my schoolwork:12345
very^
very
""^'""^
true
I am the type of person who likes to finish my schoolwork ahead of time:1234 5
^ery
very
untrue true
I intend to work on gestalt completions in the time provided:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
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I intend to work on letter series in the time provided:
1 2 3
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
I intend to work on cube comparisons in the time provided:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
I intend to work on choosing a path in the time provided:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
I intend to work on nearer point in the time provided:12 3 4
extremely
unlikely
extremely
likely
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I am not very interested in extracurricular school activities:1234
very
untrue
very
true
I really enjoy attending sports events a UMASS:12345
very
untrue
t.^^
am planning to work on gestalt completions the most often in the time provided:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
I am planning to work on letter series the most often in the time provided:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
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I am planning to work on cube comparisons the most often in the time provide12345
extremely^
extremely
unlikely
^^^^^^
I am planning to work on choosing a path the most often in the time provided:12345
^^^^^"^^•y
extremely
unlikely
lively
I am planning to work on nearer point the most often in the time provided:
1 2 3 4 5
extremely extremely
unlikely likely
In general, I really like working on puzzles:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
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I spend a lot of time playing with puzzles in my spare time:12345
very
^ very
untrue
true
I feel confident about my judgments concerning gestalt completions:1234
very
untrue
I feel confident about my judgments concerning letter series:
5
very
true
very very
untrue true
I feel confident about my judgments concerning cube comparisons:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
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I feel confident about my judgments concerning choosing a path:
1 2 3 4
very
untrue
I feel confident about my judgments concerning letter series:12 3 4
very
untrue
very
true
5
very
true
I feel good about the idea of working on these types of puzzles in the free play
period:
1 2 3 4 5
very very
untrue true
* order of puzzle within each type of question will be randomized
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